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Marginal Investor Reactions to Cash-return Announcements 
 
1. Introduction. 
In the United States prior to 2003, it was apparent that firms returning cash to shareholders 
were increasingly choosing to shift away from dividend payments in favour of repurchasing 
shares (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). This was 
indicative of an increasing preference among U.S. investors for share repurchases relative to 
dividend payments.  Recently, however, quite a different phenomenon has been found to exist 
in Australia, where no such shift has occurred (Aharoni, Brown and Wang, 2011).   
It is strongly likely that the underlying driver in both countries is taxation policy.  Evidence 
to that effect is provided by Chetty and Saez (2005) for the USA where dividends have 
traditionally been taxed at both the company and shareholder levels (double taxation), 
causing capital gains to enjoy a comparatively lighter impost.  In Australia, however, capital 
gains from the sale of shares have been taxed at investors’ personal income tax rates since 
1985 (Australian Tax Office, 2011), while a system of franking credits ensures that profits 
paid out as dividends are taxed only once.  In New Zealand the taxation of dividends is 
similar, except that franking credits are called imputation credits; but New Zealand has had 
no universally-applied capital gains tax.
1
  Are New Zealand investors, given the absence of a 
capital gains tax, like American investors in preferring share repurchases, or are they more 
like the Australians in showing some preference for dividends?  These similarities and 
differences give rise to a natural experiment based on tax treatments.
2
  
The above research question concerns the two versions of the possible relation between share 
repurchases and dividends.  In the United States, the substitution hypothesis was developed to 
                                                          
1. New Zealand has no capital gains tax on the sale of shares; unless an investor is buying 
and selling shares frequently for profit, in which case the investor is deemed to be a dealer 
and the realised capital gain will be taxed at their personal income tax rate (Emigrate NZ). 
2. There is one more distinction which is not immediately relevant to the current study, but 
which would become important in any full investigation of distribution policy choices from 
a firm’s point of view.  The US and New Zealand both allow firms to hold their own stock 
(for instance see Section 67A of the NZ Companies Act (1993)).  However, Section 
257H(3) of Australia’s Corporations Act (2001) requires that repurchased shares be 
cancelled. 
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account for the observed preference for repurchases there, while Aharoni et al (2011) 
developed the soft substitution hypothesis to account for the Australian phenomenon.   
We conduct a simple event study analysis of investor reactions to share repurchase 
announcements and to dividend announcement made by companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange.  The basic premise is that the marginal investor making the last 
trade on the announcement day provides evidence indicative of how the different types of 
cash disbursement are valued.  This evidence in event studies is the announcement day 
abnormal return.  The study uses announcements of earnings-and-dividend increases.  In New 
Zealand dividends and earnings are almost always announced simultaneously.  The sample of 
ordinary dividend announcements in this paper is restricted to those which involve a dividend 
per share (DPS) and an earnings per share (EPS) which are both larger than their counterparts 
announced a year earlier.  Hence there is an earnings effect embedded in the dividend effect 
in these announcements; but this should be relatively non-confounding in effect because 
share repurchases, generally speaking, also imply that company earnings are good.  The chief 
difference between share repurchases and dividends is that the former confer flexibility in 
that investors get to choose whether or not to participate in the announced offer, while 
ordinary dividends go, wanted or not, to all shareholders. 
We find, in spite of capital gains not being taxed while dividends are (albeit once only), the 
New Zealand marginal investor gets more excited about an increase in dividend than about a 
share repurchase. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the required background for 
understanding this study, through describing the substitution and soft-substitution hypotheses 
and then briefly discussing international literature on dividends and repurchases. In section 3 
the research questions and hypotheses are outlined. In section 4 the data collection and 
methodology used in this paper are described. Section 5 includes both the results and 
subsequent discussion, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
   
2. Literature Review. 
We start with a brief nod to the vast record of published dividend research, then consider 
share buybacks and the choice between dividends and buybacks. 
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Lintner (1956) found that firms set dividends at a level they are confident of their ability to 
maintain into the future and that this level is only raised if the firm believes it can sustain the 
increase indefinitely.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) on the other hand, argued that in a world 
without information asymmetry and taxes, dividend policy was irrelevant to the value of the 
firm.  However they did conjecture in a footnote that dividend signalling could exist; and this 
point was taken up by Asquith and Mullins (1983), who found that investors react positively 
to dividend initiations.  Asquith and Mullins credited this to the value investors place on 
dividends and the signalling value of the initiation.  Miller and Rock (1985) went on to posit 
a theory of dividend signalling. 
Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) examine, on U.S. data, abnormal stock returns generated by 
contemporaneous earnings and dividend announcements to see whether investors evaluate the 
two announcements in relation to each other, known as the corroborative effect.  Their results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings and dividend announcements are interpreted 
in relation to each other.  Lonie, Abeyratna, Power, and Sinclair (1996) find similar results 
for UK data: that both earnings and dividend announcements jointly influenced the level of 
abnormal returns earned by companies.  This should not, as mentioned in the introduction, 
pose a confounded-variable problem in the current study. 
Various factors are considered in deciding between increasing dividends and undertaking a 
share repurchase.  Bartov, Kirinsky and Lee (1998), using US data, find the main factors 
include equity undervaluation, management compensation and institutional investors’ 
holdings. For Canadian firms, De Jong, Van Dijk and Veld (2003) find the decision depends 
on behavioural and tax preferences, the existence of asymmetric information, and whether or 
not the company has executive stock option plans.  Dittmar (2000) found that firms 
repurchase stock to take advantage of potential undervaluation and to distribute excess 
capital. In addition to this, however, firms also repurchase stock during some periods to alter 
their leverage ratio, fend off takeovers and counter the dilution effects of stock options. 
Companies that enter into share buyback transactions often cite a desire to improve EPS as a 
main reason (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). For example, share buybacks can be used to 
offset the dilutive effects of employee stock options upon reported earnings per share. 
However, just because the number of shares in the denominator of the EPS ratio following a 
buyback will decrease, it does not necessarily mean that EPS will increase. Gould (2008) 
conjectures that the impact on earnings from which a firm’s resources are diverted must be 
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considered in conjunction with the reduction in shares. The impact on EPS will be positive if 
the rate of after-tax earnings forgone from the buyback programme is less than the return on 
equity capital, and negative if the opposite is true. Share repurchases are theoretically 
superior to dividends for two reasons. The first of these is that a share repurchase “beats” a 
cash dividend by the amount of the tax savings from the tax basis which protects some of the 
cash distribution from taxes, plus any subsequent earnings on the tax savings (Bierman, 
2008). The second advantage is that shareholders who do not desire immediate cash flow will 
not sell and thus will save both the taxes and transactions costs related to reinvesting. 
However, the above reasoning ignores the stock price effect that might occur if the market 
likes dividends and likes increasing dividends through time. This was found by Graham and 
Kumar (2006), who discovered on US data that the preference for dividend yield increases as 
investor age increases and decreases as investor income increases. In examining the effect of 
payout policy on institutional holdings, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) found that paying a 
dividend attracts institutional investors. As conjectured by Black and Scholes (1974, p. 21), 
stock prices of firms that pay dividends “may change temporarily in response to a change in 
the dividend, because the market may believe that the change indicates something about the 
probable future course of earnings”. However, this effect will disappear if it “becomes clear 
that the change was not made because of any changes in estimated future earnings”.   
A decreasing tendency for firms to make dividend payments and an increasing tendency for 
firms to repurchase shares is known as the “substitution effect” (Aharoni et al., 2011). 
Substitution requires firms to depart from their existing payout policies in order to undertake 
buybacks. Evidence for the United States prior to 2003 is indicative of the substitution effect 
being present (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). Grullon 
and Michaely (2002), using US data find that firms have gradually replaced dividends with 
repurchases. However, Chetty and Saez (2005) discover that dividend payments in the US 
increased by 20% following the tax reform of 2003, indicating the tax environment has an 
impact on the substitutability of repurchases for dividends. Further to this, repurchases by 
dividend initiators increased after 2003, suggesting that these firms were not simply 
substituting dividends for repurchases. Von Eije and Megginson (2008), using European 
Union (EU) data prior to 2004, find that, like in the US, the fraction of European firms paying 
dividends had declined, while the level of share repurchases had markedly increased.  
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Further, although large scale share repurchases started much later in the EU, they have grown 
even more rapidly than in the US over the past decade.  
Aharoni et al. (2011) introduce a variation of the substitution hypothesis which they call the 
soft substitution hypothesis. When either greater profitability or decreasing investment 
opportunities cause a firm to experience a situation where higher distributions to equity 
holders are feasible, it has to choose a method to distribute these additional funds. In this case 
the firm has to choose between distributing these funds through dividends or share buybacks. 
The salient feature that distinguishes soft substitution is that it only concerns the choice 
between dividends and share buybacks when a firm has excess cash. By examining the 
payout behaviour of large Australian firms, they find evidence in support of the soft-
substitution hypothesis. Any substitution that occurs in Australian firms does not involve a 
choice between dividends and repurchases, but the choice between increasing dividends and 
undertaking a repurchase.  By and large, the preferred choice is to increase the dividend. 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) provide evidence of the opposite choice in the 
US, finding that repurchases are used by firms with higher ‘temporary’, non-operating cash 
flows.  Skinner (2008), also on US data, finds repurchases are used in place of dividends even 
for firms that continue to pay dividends, and that the primary determinant of repurchases is 
the level of earnings.  
Aharoni et al. (2011) go on to provide information on the characteristics underlying share 
repurchases and payout policies in Australia. They find that firms which have increased their 
dividends are less likely to undertake a repurchase, and firms that increased dividends in the 
past are less likely to undertake a repurchase in the future.  Additionally they find there is a 
high persistence in the choice of payout method.  This means a firm that has increased 
dividends in the past is more likely to increase dividends in the future.  However, share 
repurchases can be “habit forming” too.  Bagwell and Shoven (1998) find the share-
repurchase habit to be consistent with the clientele hypothesis, which asserts that firms 
specialise in how they transmit cash to their owners.  
Aharoni et al. (2011) also find that repurchases are used as a signalling device. Firms 
undertaking a repurchase are signalling that the current negative trend in earnings is unlikely 
to continue in the future. Further to this, their results emphasise that repurchases signal a 
lower probability of a large deterioration in the firm’s future prospects, rather than a high 
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probability of a good outcome. In the US, Ofer and Thakor (1987) find that both share 
repurchases and dividends are used as signals. Although neither one dominates the other in 
all circumstances, the authors discover there is, in general, larger information content in a 
repurchase than in a dividend.  
In what follows the existence of abnormal returns will be examined, then compared over the 
three different announcement types. Explanations for the findings will be conjectured; and, 
then, the findings will be related to those of previous studies. 
 
  
3. Hypotheses. 
Given the tax structure differences in the three countries and existing findings on US and 
Australian data, it would seem reasonable to predict that the reactions of New Zealand 
investors to buybacks and to dividends will be quite distinct from each other.  Both the US 
and Australia have capital gains taxes, which implies that differences between these two 
countries are driven by how dividends are taxed.  According to Aharoni et al (2011) it is the 
presence of the dividend imputation system (franking credits) in Australia that predisposes 
the Australians favourably towards dividend increases The existence of a dividend imputation 
system in New Zealand would encourage New Zealand investors to show a similar attitude 
towards dividends, since they become tax-neutral. However, the fact that there is no 
consistent New Zealand capital gains tax would suggest on the other hand, that New Zealand 
investors should actually prefer share buybacks. 
Do New Zealanders prefer buybacks over dividends?  This research question is answered in 
terms of the reaction of the marginal investor at or near the close of announcement day 
trading captured the form of an abnormal return.  Hence, if abnormal returns are to be the 
workhorse variable employed in this paper, the first step is to determine whether the various 
buyback and dividend announcements furnish any of significance. The hypotheses, split out 
for the three announcement types, are stated in the null form and testing will be done by a 
simple t-test.  H1 covers the buyback announcement.  This is the initial announcement of a 
buyback plan which will often be explained in more detail by the firm in a follow-up-detail 
announcement.  We do not table results for investor reactions to follow-up detail 
announcements, but investigated them and found they produced statistically significant 
results similar to, but weaker than those of initial buyback announcements.   
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H1: On the days of the buyback announcements there are no abnormal returns generated 
that are significant at the 5% level. 
H2 refers to earnings-and-dividend-increase announcements. 
H2: On the days of the dividend and earnings increase announcements there are no 
abnormal returns generated that are significant at the 5% level. 
Since earnings-and-dividend announcements and the buyback announcements both imply or 
explicitly disclose an increase in earnings (or at the very least, excess cash on hand), it is 
reasonable to expect abnormal returns to be observed on the announcement date where any 
specific influence of the earnings component should not skew the results.   
The third of hypothesis is designed to detect differences in abnormal returns across the 
announcement types.  The primary measures of interest are size of abnormal returns and sign.  
These can be determined from medians, means, proportion by sign and other basic 
characteristics of the abnormal return sets. The tool for evaluating differences between sets 
will be a Kruskal-Wallis test, which evaluates median values. 
H3: There is no difference in investor reactions, in terms of abnormal returns, between 
buyback announcements and dividend-increase announcements at the 5% level of 
error in a Kruskal-Wallis test.  
With respect to the fourth hypothesis, we narrow out focus to firms employing both 
repurchases and dividends to return cash to shareholders.  In studying the abnormal returns 
generated by these firms, we move closer to generating results that can be used to shed some 
preliminary light on the relevance of Aharoni et al’s (2011) soft-substitution hypothesis in 
New Zealand. Here we use a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess differences between the returns 
sets furnished by the respective announcement types. 
H4: There is no difference in investor reactions between buyback announcements and 
earnings-dividend-increase announcements detectable by a Kuskal-Wallis test on ab-
normal returns for firms that have historically undertaken both forms of distribution. 
We can also compare investor reactions between firms that only use one method, and firms 
that use both, again in terms of a Kruskal-Wallis test:  
H5: There is no difference in investor reactions between dividend-increase announcements 
for firms that don’t undertake buybacks and dividend-increase announcements for 
firms that do undertake initial buybacks. 
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H6: There is no difference in investor reactions between buyback announcements for firms 
that do not increase dividends and buyback announcements for firms that do increase 
dividend payments. 
If the predicted preference for repurchases is verified, it would suggest evidence the 
substitution hypothesis applies in New Zealand. But this turns out not to be the case. 
 
 
4. Methodology and Data. 
We use the market model estimated on a 100-day estimation period to generate returns 
expectations and, from them, forecast abnormal returns into a 21-day test period centred on 
the day of a share repurchase or dividend announcement.  This yields ten days worth of 
abnormal returns available immediately before and after the timing of the announcement for 
comparison with the day zero abnormal return.  The returns fed into the market model’s 
estimation process are log returns calculated from daily closing price and market index data.   
The OLS market model has the following form: 
 
                 (1) 
 
Here, Rm,t is the return on the market, and Ri,t is the observed arithmetic return for security i at 
date t. Define Ai,t as the abnormal return for security i at day t. For every security, the excess 
return for each day in the event period using the OLS market model is defined as: 
 
                    (2) 
 
Three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are also calculated over the test period. This 
is simply calculated as the sum of the 1-day abnormal returns over three day periods. 
Daily data is used because a longer interval such as weekly or monthly would have greatly 
diminished the power of the tests.  Mackinlay (1997) finds that the probability of detecting a 
given level of abnormal performance of a 5 percent test using daily data is 0.94, whereas the 
power using weekly and monthly data is a mere 0.35 and 0.12, respectively. This illustrates 
the severe trade-off between accuracy and computation time from increasing the interval.  
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All of the data used in this study comes from the 17-year period starting January 2003 and 
ending December 2009.  Share buyback announcements were obtained from a data feed 
supplied by NZX Limited. This data feed was a four-thousand-page electronic transcript of 
all information released by firms in their buyback programmes, disclosure by disclosure.  The 
company name and date of buyback were recorded for each relevant announcement.  
Obtaining this restricted information set required the filtering out of huge volumes of detail in 
the data feed that was extraneous to the study.  This was done by converting the transcript 
into Excel files and employing Excel’s sorting and filtering tools. 
We then gathered a 121-day closing price information set and matching market index 
(NZX50) for each company-announcement starting 111 days prior to each announcement and 
ending ten days afterward. There prices were daily gross imputed adjusted prices provided in 
the NZX Company Deep Archive.  This price and index information furnished company log 
returns and market log returns for the 100-day estimation period and 21-day test period. 
Where a firm did not trade during the 21-day market model test period, or for less than 30 
days of the estimation period and test period combined, the company-announcement 
observation was dropped from the sample.  This led to approximately half of the recorded 
announcements being removed, most of which were from before the year 2000.  The final 
repurchase data set contains 86 buyback announcements. 
The dividend data used in the study was similarly restricted, and in several further ways.  In 
the first instance, it was restricted to announcements made at the end of a company’s year, 
which ruled out mid-year and other interim dividend announcements.  In the second instance, 
since dividends are almost always announced in conjunction with earnings, the sample was 
restricted to announcements heralding increases in dividends along with increases in 
earnings, which were the good news (++) combination in Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984).  A 
further requirement was that the dividend had to be announced within three months of a 
buyback announcement in the data set.  This provided 298 dividend announcements over this 
period.  
In addition, we locate the firms that make both dividend announcements and initial buyback 
announcements. The data set for this subsample consists of 43 initial buybacks and 101 
dividend announcements. 
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5. Results and Discussion. 
5.1 Incidence of significant abnormal returns 
The first result of interest pertains relates to the nature of abnormal returns associated with 
buyback announcements.  In Table 1, the abnormal return generated by initial buybacks on 
the announcement date is strongly significant with a p-value of 0.0015.  This allows H1 to be 
rejected.  
[Table 1 fits here] 
The average day zero mean abnormal return is 1.14%, which is 2.3 times larger than the 
largest mean return in the test period prior to the announcement, which occurs on day t-9 and 
which also turns out to be significant, although this significance is likely to be random. 
Immediately following day zero, there is a significant abnormal return on day t+1, which is 
indicative of a slow-ish news take-up by investors; but the size of abnormal returns falls 
sharply back into insignificance on day two.  The standard deviations on these days, 3.20% 
and 3.51% respectively, are also larger than all but one of the days in the test period. This 
shows that the returns on these days are spread out over a large range of values around the 
mean. In addition, both days have positive skewness and are more outlier-prone than the 
normal distribution (as measured by the kurtosis values).  
The pattern of 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in Table 2 reinforces the above 
findings.  Again H1 can be rejected.  The CAR starting one day prior to the announcement 
furnishes the highest mean in Table 2 at 2.44%; and the standard deviation of this CAR at 
5.58% is larger than any of the other CAR standard deviations. This is backed up with 
positive skewness and relatively large kurtosis, indicative of a positive sprawl towards greater 
levels of enthusiasm by some marginal investors.  
[Table 2 fits here] 
We turn now to abnormal returns furnished by earnings-and-dividend increase 
announcements.  The results in Table 3 are strongly significant for the announcement date 
and the day following (p = 0.000), allowing us to reject H2 (that there are no significant 
abnormal returns).  The announcement date has a very large kurtosis value of 34.05, which 
indicates the day zero abnormal returns are much more widely dispersed than the normal 
distribution.  
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[Table 3 fits here] 
In addition, the standard deviation on this day of 4.85% is substantially bigger than any other 
day in the test period. However, unlike all the buyback announcements, the dividend 
announcements have a relatively large negative skewness of -3.0273. This indicates that 
while the mean return is positive at 1.56%, the abnormal return distribution is asymmetric in 
a negative direction.  However, this does not mean there are more negative returns on this day 
compared to the buyback announcements, as the dividend announcements have a larger mean 
abnormal return. These results provide strong evidence indicating the presence of abnormal 
returns on the announcement date, as well as the days either side for dividend 
announcements. 
Results of a similar quality are furnished for earnings-and-dividend increase CARS in Table 
4. 
[Table 4 fits here] 
 
 
5.2. Comparisons of Abnormal Returns from Buybacks and Dividends. 
To test for differences in abnormal returns distributions between buyback and earnings-and-
dividend-increase announcements, we perform Kruskal-Wallis tests. The chi-square statistics 
and p-values are presented in Table 5.  
[Table 5 fits here] 
The first row of Table 5 records the Kruskal-Wallis results of earnings-and-dividend increase 
announcement abnormal returns versus those generated by initial buyback announcements. 
The chi-square statistic is 611.85 (p = 0.0000). This clearly rejects H3: that there is no 
difference between the abnormal returns of the two types of announcement.  The mean 
abnormal return on day zero for initial buyback announcements is 1.14 percent (standard 
deviation 3.2 percent) while the corresponding dividend mean return is 1.56 percent (standard 
deviation 4.85 percent). Although the mean return only differs by 0.42 percentage points and 
the standard deviation differs by 1.65 percentage points, the strength of the rejection warrants 
some investigation of further properties of the two abnormal return distributions. The kurtosis 
values for buybacks and dividends are 8.4093 (Table 1) and 34.0468, (Table 3) respectively. 
This indicates that the dividend distribution of returns has substantially more outliers than the 
initial buyback distribution. Therefore, the dividend distribution of returns is much flatter and 
widely dispersed than the initial buyback distribution. To analyse where most of the outliers 
14 
 
are we consider skewness. The value of skewness for dividend announcement abnormal 
returns is -3.0273 (Table 3), indicative of a leftward spread to the distribution. This is in 
contrast to the positive value of skewness of 1.9389 (Table 1) for initial buybacks . This is 
quite a substantial point of difference, implying there are more extreme negative values of 
abnormal returns for dividends than for initial buybacks. These measures indicate that the 
distributions of these two announcement samples are very different.  The Kruskal-Wallis test 
results with respect to CARs turn out to be equally strong in significance, in the second row 
of Table 5. 
The positive skewness of the abnormal return distribution for share buybacks in conjunction 
with a large kurtosis value is interesting because it is in contrast to the finding on the 
dividend data set. There are some intuitive and appealing explanations for why this is the 
case. 
The first of these is related to the tax environment facing investors when they sell shares. In 
New Zealand there is currently no capital gains tax related to the sale of shares; unless an 
investor buys and sells shares frequently. Hence, hence for everybody except frequent 
traders, the cash return comes free of tax obligations and we would expect to observe a fairly 
uniform positive response to a buyback announcement. Dividends, however, are taxed at an 
investor’s personal income tax rate. The ability of investors to avoid taxes is clearly an 
attractive attribute of share buybacks, to which investors respond positively. Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) find strong evidence that US firms use share repurchases as a substitute for 
ordinary dividends. The US economy has no form of dividend imputation credits, so 
dividends are tax disadvantaged relative to realised capital gains. 
A potential explanation as to why investors react more positively (on average) to dividend 
announcements is provided by the argument that buybacks have signalling value.  Aharoni et 
al. (2011) find evidence which suggests that firms which use repurchases are firms that tend 
to have suffered a decrease in earnings in the year prior to the buyback. They use repurchases 
to assure investors this decline is not indicative of a large deterioration in the firm’s future 
prospects.
3
 A share buyback announcement will therefore lead to a positive revision if 
shareholders had significantly downgraded their view on the firm’s future prosperity upon 
extant evidence of earnings reduction.  Just as shareholders view an increase in dividends as 
                                                          
3
 They are signalling to investors that a very bad scenario is unlikely rather than that future earnings are going 
to be good. 
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meaning firms have upgraded their expectation of future earnings (Lintner, 1956; deAngelo 
et al, 2006), they view buyback announcements as a signal by firms that the recent decline in 
earnings will not continue in the future. Clearly, dividend initiation and increase 
announcements signal more positive news than buyback initiations. This could partially 
explain the more positive reaction to dividend announcements.  
The flexibility of buyback announcements, in that shareholders do not have to sell their 
shares if they choose not to, minimises the potential for negative reactions to buyback 
announcements. When a firm announces a dividend payment, if investors do not want 
dividends they will have to sell their shares to avoid them. On the other hand, if a firm 
initiates a share buyback programme, investors have the choice to opt in (or not) to this 
distribution plan. This is a likely explanation for the greater propensity for a positive reaction 
to buybacks, resulting in the positive skewed abnormal return distribution.  
 
 
5.3. The Case of firms which use both ways to return cash. 
We now cover the results for firms that undertake both forms of distribution over the period 
1993-2009. First, we confirm that these firms, as a discrete subset, statistically significant 
abnormal returns on their announcements These preliminary results appear in Table 6, and 
Table 7.  Day zero earnings-and-dividend-increase announcements in Table 6 have a 2.06 
percent mean abnormal return (p = 0.000) with a standard deviation of 3.80 percent. This 
mean is larger than the mean for all dividend announcements by half a percentage point (1.56 
percent in Table 3).  
[Table 6 fits here] 
Further to this, the distribution of dividend-increase announcements of firms that also 
perform buybacks in Table 6 has a positive skewness (0.8525 versus -3.0273 in Table 3) and 
is strongly leptokurtic (1.3711 versus the platykurtic 34.068 of Table 3). This implies that 
shareholders of these firms react more positively than shareholders of firms that do not 
perform buybacks.  
Table 7 furnishes results obtained with respect to the abnormal returns from initial buybacks 
of firms that also pay dividends.  But this time we see little change from the original results in 
Table 1.  The mean day zero abnormal return in Table 7 of initial buybacks from firms that 
use both distribution methods is almost identical to the day zero mean of all initial buybacks, 
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as is the standard deviation of each.  Yet the Kruskal-Wallis test for differences between 
abnormal return distributions furnished where only buybacks are ever offered and where 
firms have also a dividend tradition is still strongly significant in Table 8 with a chi-square of 
201.14 (p = 0.0000).   
[Table 7 fits here] 
Making further comparisons between Table 7 and Table 1, it becomes clear that what is 
strongly different is that the skewness and kurtosis values for the reduced data set are half the 
size of the original initial buyback data set. 
This means that there is a greater propensity for investors in firms that don’t pay dividends to 
react more favourably to buyback announcements than investors in firms that also pay 
dividends.  In other words the tradition of a firm’s paying dividends appears to act as a 
dampener on the marginal investors’ enthusiasm for the buybacks it might offer.  Combining 
the buyback result in Table 7 with the dividend result in Table 6, it is clear there is a greater 
propensity (relative to the results in Table 1 and Table 3) for investors in buyback initiating 
companies to react favourably to dividend announcements, while reacting less favourably to 
buybacks if there is a history of dividend payments. Finding enable us to, at least 
qualitatively, reject the null form of H4. That posits there is no difference between marginal 
investor reactions to either kind of announcement (in abnormal returns) made by firms that 
have a history of both. 
A more hard-edged rejection is furnished by the Kruskal-Wallis test result in the top row of 
Table 8, with a chi-square statistic of 225.74 (p = 0.0000).  Here, the gap between dividend 
and initial buyback mean abnormal returns increases from 0.42 to 0.88 percentage points.  
[Table 8 fits here] 
We turn now to the final two hypotheses, which posit that there is no difference in investor 
reactions to an announcement (be it buyback or dividend) between firms that only ever use 
one form of cash disbursement and those that have historically used both.  H5 concerns 
dividends.  It is strongly rejected in the second row of Table 8 (chi-square = 631.94, p = 
0.0000) where the median percentage abnormal return for firms using both methods is almost 
half a percentage point larger than for firms which only ever disburse via dividends, while the 
mean is exactly this magnitude greater.  The null form of H6, which concerns buybacks, is 
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also strongly rejected, but with a chi-square statistic (201.14) in the bottom row of Table 8 
which is less than a third the size of dividend-related result.  The marginal investor again bids 
the share price up more for firms that use both cash disbursement methods, but not by much.  
The mean increase this time is only 0.04 percent. 
 
 
5. Conclusion. 
Although this paper uses only very simple diagnostics, this paper offers some interesting 
perspectives.  The first and least of these is that the marginal investor to reacts favourably to 
repurchase announcements in New Zealand.  Part of this uptick may well be associated with 
the signalling content of repurchases in informing investors that any decline in earnings 
experienced recently is only temporary, as proposed by Aharoni et al (2011) on Australian 
data. More generally, there must be some advantage in a cash distribution method that is an 
opt-in one as distinct from compulsory to the recipient; and to one that, for many investors, is 
not taxed. 
However investors in New Zealand react much more favourably to dividend announcements 
than they do buyback announcements.  Further, they react even more favourably when a firm 
historically furnishing both dividends and share repurchase programmes announces a larger 
dividend.  This provides some support for the soft substitution hypothesis of Aharoni et. al 
(2011) on Australian data. While the tax situation is different between the countries given 
that Australia has a capital gains tax, we still see a preference for dividends over share 
buybacks. Although this study makes no inferences about what distribution method is used 
more often, either in terms of frequency or dollar value, we can infer that investors’ reaction 
to dividends relative to buybacks would encourage firms to distribute through a dividend 
distribution.  The soft substitution hypothesis concerns the decision firms face where even 
higher distributions to equity holders are feasible.  The results of this paper, however, provide 
no support for traditional substitution. 
Given that the results of the studies on US and Australian data are largely driven by the tax 
situation in each country in that the tax-advantaged method is preferred, it reasonable to 
conclude that the neutralisation of tax implications delivered by the dividend imputation 
system trumps the absence of a capital gains tax.  Further, one would posit that the adoption 
of a capital gains tax in New Zealand would not change this preference for dividends. 
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Table 1: Initial Buyback Abnormal Returns. 
  p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
Day -10 0.8723 0.0002 0.0119 0.0437 -0.0273 0.0001 0.8027 2.5784 
Day -9 0.0381 0.0049 0.0215 0.1238 -0.0381 0.0002 2.6597 11.4803 
Day -8 0.5501 -0.0010 0.0152 0.0293 -0.0426 0.0007 -0.7574 1.0103 
Day -7 0.2261 0.0029 0.0224 0.1600 -0.0264 0.0002 4.2968 28.4939 
Day -6 0.5397 -0.0011 0.0165 0.0420 -0.0731 -0.0002 -1.3725 4.9274 
Day -5 0.7793 -0.0007 0.0227 0.0934 -0.0828 0.0008 -0.1638 5.4708 
Day -4 0.9985 0.0000 0.0207 0.1016 -0.0503 -0.0006 1.5195 7.1108 
Day -3 0.7636 -0.0005 0.0165 0.0428 -0.0682 -0.0006 -0.6483 3.5776 
Day -2 0.8248 0.0008 0.0337 0.1304 -0.2142 0.0009 -2.5028 21.1147 
Day -1 0.1336 0.0037 0.0229 0.1425 -0.0348 0.0004 3.1950 16.3080 
Day 0 0.0015 0.0114 0.0320 0.1701 -0.0782 0.0047 1.9389 8.4093 
Day 1 0.0158 0.0093 0.0351 0.1450 -0.0556 0.0020 1.6442 4.4758 
Day 2 0.4831 0.0016 0.0205 0.0826 -0.0606 0.0009 0.4768 3.1433 
Day 3 0.2168 -0.0030 0.0220 0.0484 -0.1039 -0.0011 -1.1796 5.0140 
Day 4 0.6070 0.0014 0.0249 0.1081 -0.0761 0.0006 0.2303 4.0942 
Day 5 0.6973 0.0008 0.0182 0.0849 -0.0393 -0.0008 1.5099 5.4542 
Day 6 0.9198 0.0002 0.0221 0.1466 -0.0576 -0.0003 3.1754 22.4779 
Day 7 0.6960 0.0011 0.0258 0.1516 -0.0786 -0.0004 1.9421 13.8835 
Day 8 0.8228 0.0004 0.0183 0.0712 -0.0934 0.0004 -1.1323 9.8681 
Day 9 0.2798 0.0022 0.0187 0.0782 -0.0604 0.0007 1.0338 5.9884 
Day 10 0.3207 0.0016 0.0147 0.0461 -0.0424 0.0015 0.2693 1.8663 
 
 
Table 2: Initial Buyback 3-day CARs. 
  p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
CAR -3 0.2050 0.0041 0.0298 0.1770 -0.0456 -0.0004 2.7062 13.0847 
CAR -2 0.7281 0.0012 0.0308 0.1620 -0.0839 0.0010 1.3815 8.6727 
CAR -1 0.9577 0.0003 0.0464 0.1991 -0.2184 0.0025 -0.3217 8.6068 
CAR 0 0.0001 0.0244 0.0558 0.3273 -0.0736 0.0101 2.4505 10.5354 
CAR 1 0.9975 0.0000 0.0319 0.0788 -0.0763 0.0018 -0.0887 0.0955 
CAR 2 0.6190 0.0021 0.0389 0.2137 -0.0724 -0.0026 2.6058 11.7762 
CAR 3 0.1655 0.0042 0.0280 0.0794 -0.0878 0.0050 -0.3388 2.2526 
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Table 3: Earnings-and-Dividend Increase Abnormal Returns. 
  p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
Day -10 0.7423 -0.0004 0.0218 0.0959 -0.2024 -0.0004 -2.6165 27.4788 
Day -9 0.0108 -0.0024 0.0163 0.0494 -0.0636 -0.0005 -0.6738 2.4991 
Day -8 0.2972 0.0011 0.0177 0.0901 -0.0986 0.0002 0.0529 6.9941 
Day -7 0.5930 -0.0005 0.0173 0.0988 -0.0787 -0.0007 0.1633 7.5076 
Day -6 0.0797 0.0018 0.0174 0.0644 -0.1541 0.0001 -2.2172 24.0266 
Day -5 0.1715 0.0015 0.0183 0.1206 -0.0468 -0.0005 2.0244 10.7588 
Day -4 0.0575 -0.0016 0.0142 0.0554 -0.0682 -0.0005 -0.6801 4.1321 
Day -3 0.0513 0.0021 0.0182 0.1141 -0.0581 -0.0003 1.3809 8.6406 
Day -2 0.6349 0.0005 0.0178 0.0784 -0.1085 -0.0002 -0.4278 8.6583 
Day -1 0.0166 0.0033 0.0237 0.1468 -0.1528 0.0001 0.8420 14.3130 
Day 0 0.0000 0.0156 0.0485 0.1570 -0.4674 0.0067 -3.0273 34.0468 
Day 1 0.0000 0.0088 0.0289 0.2015 -0.0913 0.0016 1.6140 8.5455 
Day 2 0.2889 -0.0013 0.0212 0.0600 -0.1207 -0.0002 -0.8198 4.7252 
Day 3 0.5764 0.0007 0.0201 0.1273 -0.0699 -0.0006 1.2505 8.0027 
Day 4 0.2848 0.0010 0.0168 0.0936 -0.0604 -0.0001 0.8629 4.3919 
Day 5 0.5222 -0.0007 0.0192 0.1795 -0.0837 -0.0006 2.3066 27.0339 
Day 6 0.5272 -0.0007 0.0193 0.0665 -0.2103 -0.0002 -4.2619 47.1656 
Day 7 0.7804 -0.0003 0.0204 0.1449 -0.1507 -0.0007 0.1775 20.2843 
Day 8 0.3858 -0.0010 0.0200 0.0941 -0.1487 -0.0002 -0.5734 13.2234 
Day 9 0.4260 0.0009 0.0188 0.1337 -0.0785 -0.0002 1.1278 10.5129 
Day 10 0.3236 -0.0010 0.0180 0.0769 -0.0752 -0.0006 -0.2726 4.7845 
 
 
Table 4: Earnings-and-Dividend Increase 3-day CARs. 
  p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
CAR -3 0.3190 -0.0018 0.0305 0.1125 -0.2020 -0.0002 -1.0169 7.1057 
CAR -2 0.1527 0.0027 0.0324 0.1925 -0.1520 -0.0011 0.7345 6.2329 
CAR -1 0.5696 0.0010 0.0298 0.1773 -0.1102 -0.0011 1.0401 7.3196 
CAR 0 0.0000 0.0277 0.0585 0.2806 -0.4700 0.0203 -1.3715 18.6724 
CAR 1 0.8459 0.0004 0.0343 0.1290 -0.1385 0.0000 -0.1093 2.4655 
CAR 2 0.3831 -0.0018 0.0346 0.2165 -0.2071 -0.0017 -0.0243 11.1152 
CAR 3 0.5019 -0.0012 0.0301 0.1130 -0.1201 -0.0017 0.0745 2.9185 
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Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis Test Output and Related Descriptive Statistics. 
Type 
Chi-square 
statistic 
Prob>Chi-square 
(p-value) 
Difference in 
means 
Difference in 
medians 
ARs: Buyback v Dividend  611.85 0.0000 0.42% 0.20% 
CARs: Buyback v Dividend 611.85 0.0000 0.33% 1.02% 
 
 
Table 6: Dividend Announcement Abnormal Returns by Share-Repurchasing firms. 
Day p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
Day -10 0.1598 0.0024 0.0167 0.0640 -0.0430 -0.0002 0.6141 2.1956 
Day -9 0.0484 -0.0028 0.0140 0.0368 -0.0636 -0.0011 -1.3266 5.3331 
Day -8 0.7114 -0.0007 0.0181 0.0504 -0.0986 0.0003 -1.3518 8.4573 
Day -7 0.9034 0.0002 0.0136 0.0584 -0.0528 -0.0006 0.2966 5.7060 
Day -6 0.2650 0.0015 0.0134 0.0392 -0.0570 0.0002 0.0247 4.1147 
Day -5 0.7275 0.0007 0.0191 0.1067 -0.0455 -0.0004 1.9466 10.1415 
Day -4 0.5378 -0.0009 0.0139 0.0554 -0.0476 -0.0001 -0.0199 3.9366 
Day -3 0.5592 0.0009 0.0155 0.0565 -0.0565 -0.0007 -0.3019 3.9002 
Day -2 0.0768 0.0030 0.0168 0.0746 -0.0347 0.0006 0.8805 3.3517 
Day -1 0.9913 0.0000 0.0215 0.0495 -0.1528 0.0001 -3.4030 25.0743 
Day 0 0.0000 0.0206 0.0380 0.1483 -0.0649 0.0114 0.8525 1.3711 
Day 1 0.0014 0.0098 0.0302 0.2015 -0.0564 0.0028 2.8142 15.6484 
Day 2 0.9557 -0.0001 0.0197 0.0466 -0.0759 0.0007 -0.5813 2.3635 
Day 3 0.7086 0.0006 0.0164 0.0671 -0.0398 -0.0006 0.7175 3.6283 
Day 4 0.0469 0.0032 0.0162 0.0559 -0.0293 0.0010 0.7698 1.0754 
Day 5 0.2503 -0.0020 0.0172 0.0441 -0.0837 -0.0006 -1.0631 5.1139 
Day 6 0.6953 -0.0006 0.0153 0.0571 -0.0479 -0.0008 0.6296 2.6604 
Day 7 0.7159 0.0009 0.0261 0.1449 -0.1507 -0.0002 -0.2569 19.8620 
Day 8 0.1826 -0.0033 0.0244 0.0941 -0.1487 -0.0007 -1.6418 14.0948 
Day 9 0.6924 0.0007 0.0176 0.0650 -0.0662 -0.0008 0.2368 3.6227 
Day 10 0.5764 -0.0010 0.0186 0.0769 -0.0752 -0.0011 -0.5689 6.9961 
 
  
23 
 
Table 7:  
Initial Buyback Announcement Abnormal Returns for Firms that issue Dividends 
Day p-value Mean StdDev Max Min Median Skewness kurtosis 
Day -10 0.4436 0.0016 0.0134 0.0437 -0.0249 0.0008 0.6650 1.7555 
Day -9 0.0492 0.0076 0.0246 0.1238 -0.0213 0.0023 3.0239 11.9072 
Day -8 0.2647 -0.0023 0.0136 0.0293 -0.0426 -0.0001 -0.9511 2.5551 
Day -7 0.5428 0.0015 0.0158 0.0575 -0.0250 -0.0006 1.2616 2.8697 
Day -6 0.5183 0.0012 0.0118 0.0420 -0.0232 -0.0002 0.8435 2.7593 
Day -5 0.2063 -0.0039 0.0201 0.0456 -0.0752 -0.0006 -0.8710 3.4040 
Day -4 0.4611 0.0028 0.0251 0.1016 -0.0503 -0.0002 1.5284 5.7187 
Day -3 0.0485 -0.0046 0.0149 0.0260 -0.0405 -0.0015 -0.4861 0.3706 
Day -2 0.1332 0.0061 0.0261 0.1304 -0.0290 0.0023 2.5950 11.5466 
Day -1 0.7107 0.0015 0.0258 0.1425 -0.0297 -0.0036 4.0183 21.3895 
Day 0 0.0223 0.0118 0.0326 0.1314 -0.0782 0.0048 0.9119 4.1875 
Day 1 0.4110 0.0048 0.0382 0.1450 -0.0556 0.0017 1.6464 4.7200 
Day 2 0.8303 0.0006 0.0193 0.0481 -0.0606 0.0027 -0.6061 2.4407 
Day 3 0.8689 -0.0006 0.0246 0.0460 -0.1038 0.0012 -1.6824 6.8030 
Day 4 0.8733 -0.0007 0.0296 0.1081 -0.0761 0.0000 0.5402 4.0095 
Day 5 0.2594 0.0033 0.0188 0.0849 -0.0260 -0.0001 2.0369 7.4708 
Day 6 0.0703 -0.0043 0.0150 0.0183 -0.0576 -0.0012 -1.4151 3.7567 
Day 7 0.3745 0.0042 0.0303 0.1516 -0.0786 -0.0006 2.4090 13.8848 
Day 8 0.4463 -0.0023 0.0198 0.0238 -0.0934 0.0001 -2.5884 10.4592 
Day 9 0.2353 0.0030 0.0163 0.0753 -0.0333 0.0012 1.9368 8.7910 
Day 10 0.2437 0.0027 0.0148 0.0461 -0.0424 0.0025 -0.2030 2.4531 
 
 
Table 8: Kruskal-Wallis Test Output for Reduced Data-set. 
Type: 
(A) vs (B) 
 
Chi-square 
statistic 
 
Prob>Chi-sq 
 
Mean A- Mean B 
 
Median A-Median B 
 
Buybacks vs. Dividends 225.74 0.0000 -0.88% -0.66% 
Dividends with 
buyback vs. Dividends 
without buyback 
631.94 
 
0.0000 
 
0.50% 
 
0.47% 
 
Buybacks with 
dividends vs. Buybacks 
without dividends 
201.14 
 
0.0000 
 
0.04% 
 
0.01% 
 
 
